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EPICURUS, SENTENTIA VATICANA XXIII
ERIC BROWN
Department of Philosophy
Campus Box 1073
Washington University
St. Louis, MO 63130
eabrown @twinearth. wustl.edu
NOTE TO THE READER. Due to a miscommunication, I received only about a week's notice o f
the deadline for this draft. Hence, it is rougher than I would like, with the arguments
underdeveloped and the research incomplete. I perceive four gaps in particular. (1) I have not
completed my search for and reading o f recent treatments o f this topic: among other things, the
articles by Brescia and Gem elli are unseen by me. (2) I have not yet searched to my satisfaction
for uses o f δΓ έαυτήν (and the like) with substantives. (3) At a couple o f key points in sections
two and three, I have indicated rather than made the argument I plan to make. (4) I have not yet
given the second alternative the sort o f defense it deserves. I apologize for these shortcomings and
plan to remedy the situation with an improved version in December.

1. The Orthodox Reading
The singular manuscript of Epicurus' Sententiae Vaticanae (SV), codex Vaticanus Graecus
1950, includes the following curious claim as number twenty-three (SV 23):
πάσα φιλία δΓ έαυτήν αρετή, αρχήν 6έ εΐληφεν α π ό τ ή ς ώφελείας.
The initial clause has long seemed especially harsh and puzzling. Is this a good Greek way of
saying that "every friendship is by itself a virtue"? And what would Epicurus mean by calling
friendship a virtue? The overwhelming majority of editors and commentators have found the
manuscript sufficiently problematic to adopt Usener's emendation of αιρετή for αρετή .*1 This

This project was originally stim ulated by an interesting and as yet unpublished paper by John MacFarlane. I am
grateful to him for the paper and for discussion. I would also like to thank Elizabeth A sm is for valuable discussion.
Throughout the notes, citations are generally made by last name only: full bibliographic details can be found in the
list o f works cited. A ll translations are mine.
1
The emendation appears in the first publication o f the Sententiae Vaticanae (also called the Gnomologium
Vaticanum), in C. W otke and H. Usener, "Epikurische Spruchsammlung." The roster o f those who adopt Usener’s
emendation is im posing, including leading editions (Arrighetti, Bailey, Bignone, Geer, Inwood and Gerson, and von
der M ühll), specific exam inations o f Epicurean friendship (Festugière, MacFarlane, M itsis, Müller, O'Connor,
Preuss), and important broader discussions (Annas, Long's Hellenistic Philosophy, Sharpies). It is worth noting,
too, that several o f these (although by no means all: see esp. MacFarlane and Sharpies) express strong confidence in
the emendation, including B ailey (p. 379), who takes it to be "a necessary correction," and Inwood and Gerson (p.
37n22), who "regard the emendation as virtually certain."
I have found only three adherents to the manuscript, none of whom makes the defense that I think is by
now required. (1) A .A . Long's adherence manifests itself in Long and Sedley (text 22F1) and in "Pleasure and
Social Utility— The Virtues o f being Epicurean." Long interprets Epicurus to be saying that friendship is "an
inherently pleasurable state o f mind, and not just a means to that end" (Long and Sedley 1:138, cf. article, p. 305).
But even if it were acceptable to think o f friendship as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable— I shall argue
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move has several points going for it: other manuscripts show confusion over this paleographically
similar pair (at, e.g., Epicurus, Ep.Men. 129), δι' έαυτήν fits better with αιρετή than with
αρετή, and the emended clause gives Epicurus the perfectly intelligible claim that "every
friendship is choiceworthy in itself."
I maintain, however, that this claim should not be attributed to Epicurus because it amounts
to a singular contradiction of our other evidence concerning his view of friendship. After arguing
against the orthodox reading, I offer two alternative approaches to S V 23. First, I give an
interpretation of the manuscript reading which agrees happily with what we know of Epicurus'
view of friendship, and then I speculate on the possibility that we should emend S V 23 but
attribute it to some later Epicurean. Both of these alternatives have advantages and disadvantages,
and while I favor the first, I am not firmly decided between them. I am, however, firmly
convinced that both are superior to the orthodox view that attributes the emended text to Epicurus,
and my primary aim here is to argue for this conviction.

2. Against the Orthodox Reading
On its face, the emended version of S V 23 says that every friendship is intrinsically
choiceworthy. The problem is that according to other evidence, Epicurus implicitly denies this
claim in favor of the view that every friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure.2
Indeed Epicurus must think that every friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure, for
he holds that every choice should be referred to pleasure, i.e., to the absence o f mental disturbance
0ataraxia) and of physical pain (aponía) (EpMen 128-129, KD 25). There are several ways of
against this view — Epicurus would not make this point by calling friendship a virtue. To Epicurus, virtue is merely
instrumentally valuable: see Epicurus, Peri Telous ap. Athenaeus xii 596f (U 70); DL X 138; De Finibus I I 48, 69;
Usener frr. 504-505, 509-515. Hence, Long is wrong to suggest that whether arete or hairete is read, "the problem
o f assigning a per se value to something other than pleasure is unaffected" (Long and Sedley 2:132, cf. article, p.
305): arete does not cany any per se value. (2) David Konstan also accepts the manuscript reading, but because he
does so in the midst o f briskly covering an enormous amount o f ground on ancient view s o f friendship, he does not
mount a full defense. And w hile I find some things to like in his brief remarks on Epicurus distinguishing between
philia in the broad sense and philia in the narrow sense, I cannot accept his claim that Epicurean philia (in any sense)
"comes to be valued for its own sake" (p. 110). (3) The best defense o f the manuscript is presented by Jean Bollack.
He (p. 451) notes that the philological evidence underdetermines the matter, and he perceives that anyone who
emends "se trouve devant la double difficulté d'avoir à opposer l’affirmation du caractère désintéressé de l'am itié à la
doctrine utilitariste, et à expliquer, dans le cas particulier, pourquoi le caractère utilitaire demeure lim ité à l'origine."
But as he explains the contrast, it is not between interestedness and disinterestedness, but between the pursuit o f
friendship for some external benefit and the practice o f friendship which itself is the benefit ("L'intérêt s’y satisfait
pleinem ent, dans la seule pratique de l'am itié... aussitôt qu'elle (viz., l'amitié) existe, le bienfait est dans l'am itié, en
dehors des bienfaits qui la motivaient"). This, too, extends Epicurus' account o f virtue too far.

2 See, e.g., DL X 120b; De Finibus Π 78, 84 (utilitatis causa am icitia est quaesita); Plutarch Adv Col
1111b.
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trying to coming to grips with this problem posed by the emended SV 23, some of which accept
the prima facie reading and argue that we must nevertheless attribute the claim to Epicurus and
others of which deny the prima facie reading. I argue that none of the reactions is satisfactory.
First, one might insist that there is other evidence in addition to the emended S V 23 that
leaves us with no choice but to attribute to Epicurus a contradictory account of friendship. Phillip
Mitsis, for example, has argued that the first Epicurean account of friendship that Torquatus
discusses in De Finibus I attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship is intrinsically
choiceworthy.3 This first account includes three crucial claims:
(A) "Som e... deny that those pleasures which pertain to our friends should be sought
(expetendas) per se as much as we seek our own." (De Finibus 1 66)
(B) "For we enjoy the joy (laetitia) of our friends just as much (<aeque) as our own and we
suffer equally their sorrows (pariter dolemus angoribus)" (167)
(C) "Thus (quocirca), the sage will be moved with respect to his friend just as he will in his
own case (eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicufn quo in se ipsum) and whatever
work he would take on for his own pleasure, he will take on for his friend's pleasure." (I

68)
I do not wish to quarrel with Mitsis' conclusion (pp. 102,112n26) that all three of these claims
accurately represent the views of Epicurus himself,4 but I reject his suggestion (pp. 100-101,102)
that claim (C) supports the attribution of the emended SV 23 to Epicurus. On my view, claim (C)
does not even entail that the sage will value his friend for herself (i.e., independent o f his own
pleasure), let alone that he will value friendship for itself.5 The second gap between claim (C) and
the emended SV 23 marks the obvious difference between friends and friendships, but the first one
is more complicated. Let us notice that if claim (A) and claim (C) are consistent, then there must be
significant stress on per se in claim (A), and the eodem modo in claim (C) cannot be taken to cover
being moved per se. On this understanding, claim (A) holds that there is difference in the finality
3 When originally citing SV 23 (p. 100n6), M itsis also cites KD 27, De Finibus I 65, and De Finibus II
83, but he rightly does not insist that these passages support the claim that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy.
Bailey (p. 379) is not so cautious and m isleadingly suggests that SV 23 sim ply agrees w ith DL X 120 and KD 27.
4 Cicero gives us ample reason to attribute all three claim s to Epicurus by presenting them as part o f one
position, by saying (Π 82) that only this position contains words o f Epicurus him self, and by kicking o ff (1 65) and
wrapping up (1 68) this view with citations o f Epicurus' actual words. To reach the same point via a different path:
if the other two positions are not attributable to Epicurus, as Cicero suggests (II 82), and if it would be odd to think
that no Epicureans in Cicero's tim e were defending Epicurus' own view , then it should be odd to think that this first
account were not Epicurus' own. O'Connor does think that (B) and (C) should not be attributed to Epicurus (p. 184),
but he is motivated in part by his conviction that the needed distinction by which to reconcile (A) and (C) is "left
utterly obscure."
5 M itsis skates over both gaps when he explains that "by showing disinterested concern for friends, one
treats friendship as a noninstrumental end" (p. 102).
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between the value of one's own pleasure and the value of one's friend's pleasure, while claim (C)
maintains that there is no difference in intensity or "action-guidingness" of the value of one's own
pleasure and the value of one's friend's pleasure.6 In support of this interpretation, it should be
noticed that claim (C) is an inference (quocirca) from claim (B), which is solely about equal
intensity of feeling. Hence, the natural reading is that claim (C) infers from equal (aeque) intensity
of feeling equal "action-guidingness," and there is no need to read eodem modo so expansively as
to contradict claim (A). So claim (C) says only that the sage is as disposed to act on behalf of his
friend's pleasure as on behalf of his own. This does not entail that the sage seeks his friend's
pleasure per se as he does his own, let alone that the sage seeks friendship per se. The emended
version of SV 23 stands alone in attributing to Epicurus this problematic claim.7
For a second approach to emended S V 23, one might insist that it reflects not a problematic
contradiction, but a virtuous tension. Perhaps Epicurus has actually come around to the best
possible view of friendship, for there just are bound to be conflicts between the intrinsic value of
friendships and other important goals and projects. I myself am sympathetic to this view of
friendship, but there are excellent reasons not to attribute it to Epicurus. First, there is no evidence
that Epicurus admits of a tension in his account of friendship. Rather, there is copious evidence
that he valued friendship for the sake of pleasure and just one emended sentence suggesting that he
valued friendship for its own sake. Furthermore, Epicurus has good reason to avoid tension in his
account of friendship, since the human good on Epicurus' view is the removal o f disturbance
(ataraxia) and tensions between friendship intrinsically valued and one’s pleasure are bound to be
disturbing.
A close cousin of this second approach can be had by admitting that the tension is
problematic for Epicurus’ theory but insisting that his view of friendship without such a tension is
even worse. In this case, our sympathy for the view that friendship has intrinsic value and
introduces tensions into our lives is so strong that we would rather attribute this view (with the
emended SV 23) to Epicurus than find him with a consistent but less plausible account of
friendship. To this I insist that consistency is the first (though not only) virtue of the philosopher,
but I also think it important to argue that a consistent Epicurean view of friendship is not nearly as
implausible as it is often made out to be. First, much of the alleged implausibility melts away if we

6 1 owe the central distinction between intensity and finality o f fellow -feeling to MacFarlane, but he should
not be held responsible for the points about eodem modo and "action-guidingness."
7 It is interesting, then, to note that M itsis refers to the emended SV 23 (by number or by the central phrase
d i’ heauten hairete) nine tim es in the first half o f his investigation (pp. 98-114). M itsis also has an interesting
account o f how and why Epicurus might have com e to this contradiction in his account o f friendship. This account,
o f course, is no reason in the absence o f positive evidence to attribute the contradiction to Epicurus, but it does raise
interesting questions for thinking about hedonic approaches to ethics.
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allow that Epicurus may not be talking about our kind of personal, passionate friendship when he
is discussing philia. Philia is invoked very broadly in antiquity, and we ought at least to allow
Epicurus the room to be advocating some friendship other than the one we are most familiar with
(before we ask whether the good life requires just Epicurean friendship or personal, passionate
friendship).8 Second, if Epicurus limits philia to sages— as I shall argue below— then the
Epicurean friend is unconcerned about death and is especially able to call to mind the pleasures of a
friendship in order to overcome any pains that it will bring. Such a limitation, then, will dull the
edge of many objections to the Epicurean account.
After considering three attempts to accept the tension that the emended S V 23 provides for
Epicurus' account, we can consider two ways of denying that the emended S V 23 provides any
tension whatsoever. In this vein, some argue that di' heauten hairete does not imply that friendship
is choiceworthy apart from pleasure.9 Rather, it implies only an attachment to friendship for its
intrinsically pleasurable qualities (as opposed to an attachment to friendship for its extrinsically
pleasurable qualities). On this view friendship produces pleasure "directly and without
intermediaries" (Rist, Epicurus, p. 132); it "brings pleasure in its e lf (Sharpies, p. 119).10
Another approach has been suggested by David O'Connor (pp. 185-186). According to this
suggestion, the second clause of the emended SV does not contrast with the first but simply
explains the origins of friendship's being hairete, and the di' heauten just emphasizes that
friendship is choiceworthy so far as it is concerned, considered apart from circurmstances that may
render it un-choiceworthy.11
These two readings share two difficulties. First, they do not offer a natural construal of
what is a perfectly natural sentence. The emended SV 23 naturally presents a contrast (de) between
friendship di' heauten hairete and the origins of friendship chosen apo tes opheleias, and this
contrast naturally suggests that friendship di' heauten hairete is chosen regardless of the opheleia it
brings. My emphasis on the natural reading has some support elsewhere. First, there is some
reason to think that Epicurus would restrict his use of di' heauten hairete to pleasure chosen noninstrumentally, since his only extant use of hairete shows this restriction (EpMen 129: ou pasa
[hedone] hairete) and Torquatus says that Epicureans characterize pleasure as what is itself and per
8 O'Connor develops this point very w ell.
9 1 have found this view m ost clearly expressed in Rist {Epicurus), MacFarlane, and Sharpies.
10 Ironically, Long advances this interpretation o f friendship's value as a defense o f the manuscript (see note
1). Long, Sharpies (p. 144n5), and D ihle (in the discussion o f Long’s "Virtues o f Being Epicurean," p. 317) agree
that there is no substantive difference between the manuscript reading and the emended version. Disagreeing, I insist
that calling philia arete means that it is not chosen di' heauten (see DL X 138), contrary to the emended version.
11 O'Connor directs our attention to the claim that not every pleasure is hairete {EpMen 129), since some
pleasures lead to a greater amount o f pain (KD 8).
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se to be sought (131: voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam).1213 And all by itself, dV heauten in
emended SV 23 suggests that one need not look outside of friendship at all for its
choiceworthiness. Friendship must itself possess what makes it choiceworthy; what advantage
friendship brings is beside the point. If friendship is merely pleasurable and not a pleasure— and
friendship cannot be a pleasure on Epicurus' view of pleasure— then friendship cannot be di'
heauten hairete.
Further insistence on escaping this conclusion by an unnatural reading meets with a
second, more important objection. If friendship contains in itself what directly produces pleasure,
then it will be just like virtue on Epicurus’ account. This would be sensible insofar as Epicureans
are quick to give the same account for the value of virtue and for that of pleasure {De Finibus 1 66,
68). But the doxographers also attribute to Epicurus the explicit denial that virtues are hairesthai
dV haut as.u The conjunction of these two commitments contradicts the emended S V 23.
In a quite general way this contradiction brings us back around to the initial tension that the
emended S V 23 presents. For the emended version of S V 23 drives a wedge between the account
of virtue and friendship because friendship is said to be di' heauten hairete while virtues are always
more remotely productive of pleasure, not hairesthai di' hautas. This is just an instance of the
general problem. There is copious evidence for Epicurean ethics that even the most supremely
valuable things other than pleasure are valuable only at a distance in their service of pleasure, and
that evidence stands against the suggestion of the emended version of SV 23 on any reading.
Charity demands that we look for alternative construals of SV 23.

3. First Alternative
First, there is a natural way of unproblematically interpreting Epicurus' claim that every
friendship is by itself a virtue: Epicurus is saying that friendship is an inherently virtuous state of
soul.14 Since virtues are valuable only instrumentally, Epicurus is not saying that friendship is
12 It is hard to trust the vocabulary o f the doxographers for words like hairete too much, but they, too, tend
to support the restriction o f hairete to pleasure. See, e.g., Sextus PH ΙΠ 194 or Μ X I 94. And lest it be thought a
priori im plausible that Epicurus would have restricted this term in this way, consider the way Diogenes Laertius’
account o f the Cyrenaics overwhelmingly associates hairete with hedone (Π 88-92).
13 This phrase is used at DL X 138, but the attribution is supported by the way the evidence for the merely
instrumental value o f virtue stresses a distance between virtue and pleasure (despite the fact that Epicurus believes
that virtue necessarily leads to pleasure: EpMen 132, KD 5, DL X 138, Fin 1.57, etc.). See Epicurus, Peri Telous
ap. Athenaeus xii 5 96f (U 70); DL X 138; De Finibus Π 48, 69; Usener frr. 504-505, 509-515. N ote that this
objection to the emended SV 23 holds for any interpretation: it must drive a problematic wedge between the accounts
o f friendship and virtue.
14 N ote that w e do not have to interpret the manuscript in such a way that every friendship is an "intrinsic
virtue," pace M itsis (p. 101n6) and Preuss (p. 207n32).
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valuable per se. Rather, he is making two points: friendship is really about one's own soul and
friendship is possible only for the virtuous.
The second of these points is easy enough to attribute to Epicurus. Aristotle and the Stoics
limited genuine friendship to the virtuous,15 and there is independent evidence that Epicurus did the
same. It is wisdom (,sophia, sapientia) which devises friendships (KD 21=Fin 1 65) and the noble
person (gennaios) who is concerned with wisdom and friendship (SV 78). Further, friendship is
said to be "sustained by a commonality among those who are filled up with pleasures" (DL X
120b), and Epicurean references to friends frequently identify them as sages.16
But can we attribute the claim that friendship is about one's own soul and not just about a
relationship to another to Epicurus? There is no reason not to. After all, character states and
virtues require all sorts of things, and some of them, like justice, even require certain attitudes and
behavior in relation to others. So why should friendship not be a disposition o f the soul toward
certain beliefs and actions in relation to certain others? Here it is worth noting that the Stoics were
at least tempted to say that two sages are friends (though not totally (pantos) friends) even if they
have never met and that Aristotle comfortably classes philia as a kind of virtue (tis arete) or
something "with virtue" (met' aretes) (E N V ÍE A 1155a3).17 As the Stoics and Aristotle suggest, it
would be implausible to suggest that friendship is merely a state of soul, but the manuscript for SV
23 does not suggest that. It suggests only that friendship is a virtuous state o f soul.
Not only is it possible for Epicurus to say this; he has good reason to do so. One difficulty
his account of friendship faces is posed by the vulnerability attachment to friends causes. But if
friendship is largely about one's state of soul and if friendship requires wisdom, then the
vulnerability imposed by attachment to friends will be much less threatening. That is why
Epicurus would have good reason to say that friendship is a virtue. The statement is a bit obscure,
but Epicurus avows that obscurity will not stop him from speaking the beneficial truth (SV 29): "I
would rather use frankness (parrhesia) in my study of nature and proclaim things that are
15 For A ristotle, see, e.g., EN 1156b7-8 on "perfect (teleid) friendship," and for the Stoics, see, e.g., DL VII
124.
16 DL X 1 1 8 ,121b; De Finibus I 68, 70. A lso, Cicero's retort to the Epicureans that "there is enough
protection in ordinary friendships (mediocribus amicitiis)" (Π 84) makes sense only if they were interested in
extraordinary friendship. It m ight be objected that a restriction o f friendship to sages w ill make unintelligible the
reports that Epicurus had huge numbers o f friends (DL X 9, De Finibus 1 65), but it is entirely possible that these
reports are trading on a different sense o f "friends" as adherents to Epicurus' school.
17 For the Stoic position, see Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeus Π 101, 21 Wachsmuth: "All the excellent
benefit each other— even when they are not totally (pantos) friends with each other... on account either o f being
unknown or o f not living in the same place— they are still disposed toward each other in a kindly, friendly
(philikos), approving, and receptive fashion." Consider also Seneca, EpMor ix 8, in the context o f comparing Stoic
and Epicurean friendship: "The sage, even though he is content, nevertheless wishes to have a friend, if for no other
reason than in order to exercise friendship, lest such (a?) great virtue go to waste (ne tarn magna virtus iaceat)."
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advantageous for all people— even if no one would understand—than assent to opinions and reap
the heavy praise that falls from the many.”
Finally, there is some independent evidence that Epicurus identified philia as an arete. So
far I have mentioned that Epicureans were quick to analyze the value of friendship and virtue in the
same way. But the evidence says more than this. According to Diogenes Laertius, "Epicurus says
that virtue alone (ten areten monen) is inseparable from pleasure" (X 138), and Cicero records the
attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure (Fin 1 66). From
the conjunction of these two claims, it follows that friendship is (at least a part of) virtue.18
I have been arguing that it makes good philosophical sense to attribute to Epicurus the view
that philia is an arete, but the manuscript reading of S V 23 actually attributes to Epicurus the claim
that philia is dV heauten arete. To this there can be philological objections.19 With the substantive
arete and no verb, hath' heauten, it must be admitted, would have been much more natural.20 W e
are left weighing philological disadvantages and philosophical advantages. At this point, it is
difficult to advance arguments, for the reader's temperament is centrally at issue. To this reader,
Epicurus' Greek frequently seems a bit unnatural, and so emending on purely stylistic grounds
seems imprudent. And even were that not the case, so long as I am faced with a choice between an
unnaturally constructed sentence that makes a good philosophical point and an emended, natural
sentence that creates a deep and problematic philosophical inconsistency, I will prefer to believe
that Epicurus wrote the former.

4.

Second Alternative

But what if Epicurus did not write S V 23 at all? A second alternative to the orthodox
interpretation is to accept the emendation by the force of the philological objections but to insist that

18 It is o f course possible that D iogenes Laertius has gotten carried away with his addition o f 'alone'

(monen): other accounts o f the inseparability o f virtue from pleasure do not insist that it alone is inseparable
(EpMen 132, KD 5, Fin 1.57). But even if w e choose to read monen away, w e ought to recognize that Epicurus has
good reasons not only to treat virtue and friendship in very sim ilar ways but also to say that friendship is a virtue.
19 But note that an interpretation favoring an unnatural Greek sentence is very different from an
interpretation which offers an unnatural reading o f a perfectly natural Greek sentence, like the ones discussed for the
emended SV 23.
20 Dihle's response to Long’s "Virtues o f Being Epicurean” (p. 317) puts the philological objection w ell:
"Aber δι' έαυτήν ist ein Ausdruck m it finaler Bedeutung, den man ungern einfach mit einem Substantiv verbindet.
Καθ' έαυτήν läge näher." This leads Long to suggest (p. 319) that perhaps w e should suppose "the loss o f a word
such as νενόμισται," a suggestion that is surely more editorially intrusive than the paleographically plausible
emendation.
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Epicurus is not the author.21 While this view of our sentence smells faintly of desperation, we
should remind ourselves of how real this possibility is.
First, several of the sentences in the Vatican collection are elsewhere attributed to some
author other than Epicurus.22 While the writings of Epicurus and Metrodorus likely did share
some sentences, we still are given cause to wonder about the compilation of this text.
Second, we know that certain Epicureans other than Epicums (see Fin Π 82) came to hold
the view that "friends love their friends for their own sakes" (amici propter se ipsos amentur, Fin I
69). Assuming that propter se ipsos amentur cannot be deflated just as di heauten hairete cannot
be deflated,23 these Epicureans will be seen as innovators who are admitting sources of value
independent of constant reference to one's own pleasure. In this case, it is not difficult to imagine
that these Epicureans also hold that friendship is di' heauten hairete.
And so if we are convinced that the manuscript o f S V 23 is unacceptable Greek and that the
emended version is unacceptably at odds with Epicums' other commitments, we might be forgiven
in speculating that some other Epicureans believed that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy and
had that belief memorialized in a manuscript now in the Vatican collection.
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